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Why Do Supreme Court Justices Succeed or
Fail? Harry Blackmun as an Example
Lawrence S. Wrightsman'
Justin R. La Mor?
I. INTRODUCTION

At present, 108 Justices have served on the United States Supreme
Court.3 Some have clearly been successes as judges, while a few have clearly
not, and a large number are cast into that middle, "satisfactory" or "average,"
category. The purpose of this paper is to propose, examine, and evaluate specific factors as determinants of judicial success, and then to consider Justice
Harry Blackmun's place on a continuum of successes and failures.
The paper is divided into three sections. First, it reviews several ideal
qualities and examines the results of several surveys of experts, which classify the Justices into categories based on their relative degree of success. Second, this article considers whether success can be predicted, and in answering
this question offers several case histories illustrating examples of when judicial success could not be predicted.
Finally, because the purpose of this symposium is to commemorate the
release of Justice Blackmun's papers, this article evaluates Justice Blackmun
on the success-failure continuum. Because of his shift in position during his
24 years on the Court, Justice Blackmun is especially of interest. This article
further analyzes and proposes explanations for his shift.
II. WHAT CHARACTERISTICS DOES AN IDEAL JUSTICE POSSESS?
A. Specifications of the Ideal
Numerous observers have specified the background qualities an ideal
Justice should possess. Henry Abraham identified six core qualities: absolute
personal and professional integrity, an agile and lucid mind, "professional
expertise and competence, .

.

. appropriate professional educational back-

ground or training," the capacity to communicate clearly (especially in writ-

1. Professor of Psychology, University of Kansas.
2. Undergraduate student, University of Kansas, Lawrence.

3.

BERNARD SWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS

278,288 (1997).

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON AND CLINTON 2

4.

(1999);

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:

APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 4

A

POLITICAL HISTORY OF

(3d ed. 1992).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

1

1262

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 13
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

ing), and "judicial temperament." S In addition to the above, Sheldon Goldman
suggested neutrality, "[g]ood [p]hysical and [mental [h]ealth," and the
"[a]bility to [h]andle [jiudicial [p]ower [s]ensibly."
Blaustein and Murphy, considering the criteria a president should consider in nominating a Justice, have suggested the following: scholarship, analytical powers, writing ability, general knowledge, willingness to work hard
and take responsibility, courage, and character.
While each of these makes sense, each is an internal quality. Further,
these conceptions do not reflect a view that a Justice might be ideal for one
time period but not for another.
The various characteristics described above can be collapsed into abilities, personality traits, and professional experience. Abilities include a certain
level of intelligence, an ability to communicate and analytical skill. Personality characteristics are comprised of a willingness to work hard, courage, good
mental health, integrity, and the undefined-but-important "judicial temperament." Professional experience is based upon educational background, training, and neutrality.
In fact, some commentators suggest that prior judicial experience is not
relevant to a Justice's success on the Supreme Court. Justice Felix Frankfurter, himself a first-time jurist, was the most visible spokesperson for this
point of view and concluded, "it would be capricious to attribute acknowledged greatness in the Court's history either to the fact that a Justice had had
judicial experience or that he had been without it." 9 Other scholars have echoed this conclusion,' 0 with one scholar concluding that great Justices often
had no prior judicial experiences.' An analysis of the ratings of the Justices
appointed in the 20th century finds no relationship between experience and
greatness. While it is true that Justices Hughes, Warren, and Brandeis did not

5. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS, supra note 4, at 1-2;
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS, supra note 4, at 4.
6. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS, supra note 4, at 1-2.
7. ALBERT P. BLAUTSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-51

(1978) (R. Lawrence Siegel & Claire Rocco contributed to this portion of the survey).
8. Robert C. Bradley, Who Are the GreatJustices and What CriteriaDid They
Meet?, in AMERICAN UNIVERSITY STUDIES, GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: RATINGS AND CASE STUDIES 7-9 (William D. Pederson & Norman W.
Provizer eds., 1993).
9. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the MirrorofJustices, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 781, 784 (1957).
10. See JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 43-47 (1958); Thomas G. Walker & William E. Hulbary, Selection of Capable
Justices: Factors to Consider, in THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL
STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 52, 66 (Albert P. Blaustein
& Roy M. Mersky eds., 1978).
11. See FRANK, supra note 10, at 273.
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have prior judicial experience, Justices Brennan, Holmes, and Cardozo did.'
We conclude that other characteristics are much more important than degree
of judicial experience.

B. Ratings of Successes andFailures
Another approach to specifying ideal judicial characteristics is to distinguish the effective. Justices from the ineffective, and then determine if they
differ in identifiable qualities. Over the last 35 years, several surveys have
asked scholars to rate the effectiveness or success of the Justices.' 3 In 1970,
Blaustein and Mersky asked 65 law school deans and professors of law, history, and political science to evaluate the performance of the first 96 Justices
on the Court.14 The results led to the classification of 12 Justices as "great."' 5
A total of 15 were "near great,"'16 55 were "average,"' 17 six were "below average, '"18 and eight were rated as "failures."' 19 These 96 included both chief
Justices and associate Justices, 20 although perhaps the criteria for success for
the two should be somewhat different.
Shortly before his death, Bernard Schwartz provided his personal take
on the ten "best" 2 1 and ten "worst, 22 Justices. In order, his ten "best" were
Justices John Marshall, Holmes, Warren, Story, Brennan, Brandeis, Hughes,
Black, Field, and Taney. 23 His "worst" were Justices Moore, Whittaker, Vinson, McReynolds, Peckham, Samuel Chase, Barbour, Salmon P. Chase, But-

12. Id. at 43-44; Norman W. Provizer & Joseph D. Vigil, The Earl of Justice:
Warren's Vision for America, in

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY STUDIES, GREAT JUSTICES OF

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND CASE STUDIES

261, 261-62 (William D.

Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 1993).
13. See BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 7, at 32-54; Bradley, supra note 8, at

14.
14. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 7, at 34. This survey was reprinted in a
book published recently by Bader and Mersky, but does not rate the most recent 12
justices.
15. Id. at 37. Those Justices included Marshall, Story, Taney, Brandeis, Stone,
Cardozo, Harlan I, Holmes, Hughes, Black, Frankfurter, and Warren. Id.
16. Id.at 37-38.
17. Id. at 38-39.
18. Id. at 39.
19. Id. at 40. This category included Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Burton, Vinson, Butler, Byrnes, Minton, and Whittaker. Id.
20. Id. at 35-36. This survey was reprinted in a book published recently by Bader
and Mersky, but the latter book still does not rate the most recent 12 justices.
WILLIAM D. BADER & RoY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT JUSTICES
25-29 (2004).
21. SWARTZ, supra note 3, at 3-26.

22. Id. at 28-45.
23. Id. at4.
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ler, and Minton.24 The worst cover a multitude of sins, and again25reflect both
chief Justices (Vinson and Salmon Chase) and associate Justices.
In 1998, Michael Comiskey reported a comprehensive survey in a paper
at the American Political Science Association convention 26 and in his 2004
book.27 The study limited the number of Justices to those 52 appointed in the
twentieth century, beginning with Holmes and ending with Breyer. 28 A total
of 128 constitutional scholars, in both political science and law, were asked to
rate the Justices on a five-point scale from "excellent" to "failure." 29 Of the
52, the scholars rated 11 as "excellent;" 30 Justices Holmes and Brandeis were
tied for first, followed by Justices Brennan, Harlan II,
Cardozo, Black, War31
ren, Hughes, Stone, Robert Jackson, and Frankfurter.
In each of these surveys, respondents were not given definitions of
"great" or "excellent," 32 thus, for most of the studies there is little information
which qualities of an ideal Justice were most emphasized or most salient.
However, in 1978, Walker and Hulbary did seek to identify those traits that
distinguished between types.33 But they concluded the following:
Our analysis has not uncovered any one trait which clearly distinguishes the capable from the incapable. Nonetheless, certain patterns tend to emerge. On one hand, if we were to develop a profile
of an individual with a strong likelihood of becoming an excellent
jurist, he would be a person raised in a northeastern urban area as a
member of a business-oriented family. His ethnic roots could be
traced back to the European continent and he would be Jewish. He
would have received his education from high-quality institutions
and would have experience in the academic community as a legal
scholar. He would have been appointed to the Court at a relatively
early age, without prior judicial experience, and serve in that institution for more than twenty-five years. On the other hand, if we
were to describe the background of a typical Supreme Court "failure," he would be a man from the midwestern United States, raised
in a small town and from a family engaged in farming. His ethnic
origins would be Scottish or Irish and he would be affiliated with a
24. id. at 29.
25. Id. at 45-46.

26.

ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS, supra note 4, at 372.
MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT
NOMINEES 87-103 (2004).

27.

28. Id.
at 90.
29. Id. at 88.
30. Id. at 92.
31. Id. at 91.
32. Id. at 88; BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 7, at 36;
27, at 88.

COMISKEY,

supra note

33. See generally Walker & Hulbary, supra note 10.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/13
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"low church" Protestant denomination. He would have attended
mediocre educational institutions and his career would have been
closely tied to partisan political activities. His appointment to the
Court would have occurred during his mid-fifties and he would
serve less than five years. These, of course, are general profiles.
There are exceptions to every broad generalization, as attested to
by the fact that McReynolds served more than a quarter-century
McReynolds is universally rated a
and Cardozo but six years. Yet 34
"failure" and Cardozo a "great."
Blaustein and Murphy completed their book shortly after Warren Burger
was appointed Chief Justice; Walker and Hulbary, in an article published in
Blaustein and Murphy's book, wrote, presciently:
Among the most recent five, Chief Justice Burger appears to have
the most strikes against him. While his age at appointment (62) and
ethnic background (Swiss/German) are similar to those justices
who have served well in the past, his family origins (rural, farming), region (Midwestern), religion (Protestant), education (University of Minnesota and St. Paul College of Law), and judicial experience (thirteen years) are factors which, over the history of the
associated with less than distinguished levels of
Court, have been
35
performance.
C. Our Conception of Effectiveness
All of the above ratings are based on global impressions, that is, raters
were not asked to consider specific determinants of "effectiveness" or "greatness." However, the purpose of this article is to narrow the definition of judicial effectiveness to a single behavioral quality: the ability to influence. The
"ability to influence" has two different aspects. First is the ability to write
opinions that are of significance to the country. Accepting the view of the
rational-choice theorists that Justices act to achieve public-policy goals, 36 to
what degree are the goals of individual Justices reflected in the corpus of
decisions by the Court? Second is the ability to influence other members of
the Court, i.e. can the Justice bring others to his or her position? While "persuasiveness" might seem central to this quality, the ability to influence also
reflects a number of the ideal qualities listed above, including the ability to
34. Id. at 69-70.
35. Id. at 71.
36. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 1 (1964). See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 22-55 (1998).
Rational-choice theory proposes that judges have long-term policy goals and that their
votes reflect strategic considerations, not just their positions on the specific issues of

the case.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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think clearly, good working habits, a strong intellect, and good mental health.
Even among the "great" and "near great," some Justices were more effective
in influencing their colleagues than were others.
While no objective means of assessing influence among the Supreme
Court Justices has been applied, a recent article by Choi and Gulati offers 3a
judges. 7
somewhat analogous approach to the evaluation of circuit court
Under their formula, if a circuit court judge is being considered for promotion
to the Supreme Court, his or her opinions should be examined by collecting
data that answer the following questions:
38
(1) How often are his or her opinions cited in later opinions?

(2) What has been the workload of the judge?

39

the judge's opinions been independent of political ideol(3) Have
40
ogy?
Research needs to be done to examine the extent to which the opinions of
those Justices who earlier were lower court judges were treated by other courts.
III. CAN SUCCESS BE PREDICTED?
A Justice's ability to influence others is determined both by personal
qualities and the context, as defined by the spirit and the constituency of the
Court. Consider here, two contrasting examples of Justices, both among the
most outstanding, with differing ability to influence.
A. Two DisparateExamples
While it may be true that the background of a prospective judge correlates to his or her general effectiveness as a Supreme Court Justice, it is not
always the case. Two contrasting examples will illustrate some of the problems with this approach.
1. Felix Frankfurter
If ever there was a newly-appointed Justice who was expected not only
to serve effectively, but to lead the Court, it was Felix Frankfurter. Harold
Ickes, advisor to Franklin Roosevelt, told the president: "If you appoint
37.
316-321
38.
39.
40.

Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament ofJudges, 92 CAL. L. REv. 299,
(2004).
Id. at 306.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
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Frankfurter, his ability and learning are such that he will dominate the Supreme Court for fifteen or twenty years to come. The result will be that,
probably after you are dead, it will still be your Supreme Court."4' In addition, both Robert Jackson, then Solicitor General but later a Justice himself,
and Harlan Fiske Stone, then an associate Justice, emphasized to the president
the extent of Frankfurter's ability to compete intellectually with the then chief
Justice, Charles Evans Hughes. 42 Archibald MacLeish, the highly-regarded
poet, playwright and graduate of Harvard Law School, predicted that, as a
Justice, Frankfurter would be a defender of the Bill of Rights because of his
passionate and scholarly support of the defendants in the Sacco-Vanzetti
case. 43 What made Frankfurter so promising? As a young man, Frankfurter
had sought out Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis as mentors and had soaked up their tutelage. 44 As a distinguished law professor at
Harvard, Frankfurter had already trained many law students who later became
eminent judges themselves. 45 He secured appointments as Supreme Court law
clerks for many of his best students. His interest in liberal causes, exemplified
by his vigorous defense of Sacco and Vanzetti, led observers to expect that he
would mesh well with the increasingly progressive thrust of a Court dominated by Roosevelt appointees.46
Professor Frankfurter was so highly regarded that before he was named
to the Court, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone had called upon him to instruct
a new Justice, Hugo Black, on the proper way to behave. 47 "Do you know
Black well?" Stone asked Frankfurter early in 1938; 48 "You might be able to
who is more
render him great assistance. He needs guidance from someone
' 9
familiar with the working of the judicial process than he is."4
Frankfurter was not only an eminent law professor - described by editorial writers as "America's most distinguished legal scholar" 50 - but he was
steeped in Washington politics. While still at Harvard, he became a longtime
41. HAROLD ICKES, INSIDE THE STRUGGLE 1936-1939, 540 (1954). While some
have said that Franklin Roosevelt did not give adequate attention to the selection of
Justices - and he came to name nine to the Court - certainly he knew of Frankfurter's
brilliance and his already-established impact on the government. See, e.g., MELVIN
UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 3637 (John Cooper, Jr., ed., 1991).
42. A.T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW, 482 (1956).
43. JOSEPH P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 36-37 (1975).
Sacco and Venzetti were two immigrants who were convicted of bank robbery and
executed, even though many felt they were innocent.
44. LASH, supra note 43, at 7-9.
45. UROFSKY, supra note 41, at Preface.
46. See generally UROFSKY, supra note 41, at 34-41.
47. Id. at 45.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. LASH, supra note 43, at 64.
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behind-the-scenes advisor to Franklin Roosevelt, beginning when the latter
was governor of New York and continuing after he was elected president.5 1 In
his role as informal counsel, he served Roosevelt as teacher and expert on
topics extending far beyond narrow legal issues.5 2 When Roosevelt was initially elected president in 1932, Frankfurter provided names of persons who
came to staff essential New Deal positions. 53 As one biographer pointed out,
"In time, scores of his former students and prot6g6s would find their way to
Washington, creating a network of influence for Frankfurter
that extended
54
into virtually every crevice of the growing bureaucracy."
Always thirsting for new ideas, Frankfurter captivated Roosevelt. The
President told an associate: "Felix has more ideas per minute than any man of
my acquaintance., 55 He even arranged for the Harvard professor to live in the
White House for much of the summer of 1935;56 by that time Frankfurter was
acknowledged as "perhaps the single most important non-elected official in
[the] national government."" 58And this was four years before he was appointed to the Supreme Court.
Frankfurter served 23 years on the Court, from 1939 to 1962. 59 He wrote
247 opinions for the Court, 132 concurring opinions, and 251 dissents. 6 0 But
he was expected to dominate the Court and he expected to be "its intellectual
leader and that the authority he exercised in his seminar at Harvard would be
replicated in the conferences of the Brethren." 6 1 He even told another Justice
that "I was appointed to this Court as a professor, so to speak. '' 62 However,
the Court never realized the impact that Frankfurter's intelligence, energy,
63
experience, and credentials should have warranted. 64 While he did lead
briefly, his leadership was temporary though significant.

51. H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 104 (1981).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 103.
54. Id.
55. LASH, supra note 43, at 46.
56. HIRSCH, supra note 51, at 116-17.
57. Id. at 99.
58. LASH, supra note 43, at 63. It is interesting to note that when his nomination
to the Supreme Court finally came, Frankfurter addressed the letter of reply to the
President, "Dear Frank." Id. at 65.
59. See BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 7, at 37.
60. Id. at 145.
61. LASH, supra note 43, at 75.
62. Id. at 228.
63. See generally UROFSKY, supra note 41. Urofsky is a biographer of Frankfurter who treats his subject objectively.
64. LASH, supra note 43, at 68; see Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
These two cases dealt with the legality of compelling school children, specifically
member of Jehovah's Witnesses to participate in a salute to the flag. Justice Frankhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/13
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Certainly no one would call Justice Frankfurter a failure. Some experts
regard his contributions quite highly. While Bernard Schwartz did not include
him in his list of the "10 greatest" Justices, he did include him in a small "good
but not great" category. 65 Comiskey's sample of scholars gave him a rating of
3.27, or eleventh highest among the 52 twentieth-century Justices. 66 His influence on his brethren was less than expected; as Schwartz put it, "Frankfurter
seemed altogether different as a Justice than he had been off the bench. 67
Why so? Biographers have described the image that Justice Frankfurter
usually presented as "a vibrant personality: witty, charming, warm, energized,
sparkling." 68 Yet he possessed less desirable qualifies and could be resentful,
arrogant, and domineering. His diaries reveal passages "full of wrath, contempt [and] superciliousness." 69 One of his biographers observed that he
"could not accept serious, sustained opposition in fields he considered his
70
domain of expertise; he reacted to his opponents with vindictive hostility."
No dearth of speculation exists about why Justice Frankfurter was not a
more effective Justice, given his extensive years in the limelight, the depth
and breadth of his scholarship, and the massive amount of material written
about him. Two reasons stand out. First, Justice Frankfurter failed to adapt to
new surroundings on the Court. 71 For the first time in his life, he could not
dominate his colleagues by the force of his intellect and his undeniable energy.72 One observer wrote: "The Supreme Court

. .

. was an environment

unlike the ones in which Frankfurter had triumphed; he was [forced into]
sharing power with strong-willed individuals who had ideas of their own.

73

Not only was he now among intellectual equals, but the content of his
ideas conflicted with the tides of change. 74 As one biographer put it, he committed "the same sins for which he, as an academic commentator, had lambasted the conservative judges of the 1920s75and 1930s. He remained consistent, but consistency is not always a virtue."

The second reason for Justice Frankfurter's less-than-anticipated level of
effectiveness on the Court is related to the first. Throughout his adult life,
Justice Frankfurter had relied on ingratiation and flattery to facilitate his in-

furter wrote the majority in the first case in 1940, only to see the Court reverse itself
three years later in the second opinion.
65. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 22-24.
66. COMISKEY, supra note 27, at 91.
67. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 23.
68. HIRSCH, supra note 51, at 4.
69. LASH, supra note 43, at Preface.
70. HIRSCH, supra note 51, at 5-6.
71. See id. at6.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. UROFSKY, supra note 41, at 178.
75. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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fluence. 76 In his younger days, the recipients of his attention were his mentors
Henry Stimson and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.; later, it became Franklin
Roosevelt. 77 A biographer noted, "In their 772 pages of published correspondence, there is an almost unbelievable amount of flattery heaped on the President by Frankfurter. After speeches, he would send telegrams, comparing
FDR to Lincoln. ,,78 And, tellingly, although Justice Frankfurter would often
criticize the President in his letters to others - saying for example, "I don't
expect heroic action from him" - he never made a single criticism directly to
Roosevelt. 79 Thus Justice Frankfurter's treatment of the President reflected
his general style of insincere flattery and hypocrisy.
However, once appointed to the Court, Justice Frankfurter found flattery
ineffective.80 He deluged his brethren with suggestions and compliments (and
occasionally with criticisms) but his colleagues - strong-willed and competent people such as Justices William 0. Douglas, Hugo Black, Charles Evans
Hughes, and later, Earl Warren, William Brennan, and John Marshall Harlan,
II - perceived themselves as his equals and had no need for help from the
former professor.8 1 Even Justice Frank Murphy, not known for his legal
craftsmanship, came to call Justice Frankfurter's scholarship "elegant
allbunk., 8 2 Despite this, Justice Frankfurter continued to play the role of an
83
elucidation.
of
need
in
as
saw
he
students
eight
the
to
knowing professor
As Justice Frankfurter failed to exert his expected influence, he often
turned from effusive flattery to hostile criticism.84 One biographer concluded,
"He would flatter them as long as they agreed with him, but at the first sign of
independent thought he would explode." 5 He came to alienate almost all of
his colleagues at one time or another. Justice Douglas wrote:
[W]e had become pretty well separated from Frankfurter. This is
nothing that happened overnight. ...Frankfurter had just lost the respect of Black and myself and Murphy ....We learned that he was
utterly dishonest intellectually, that he was very, very devious. None
of us had known him very well, but he spent his time going up and
down the halls putting poison in everybody's spring, setting, trying
to set one justice against another, going to my office and telling me

76. HIRSCH, supra note 51, at 105-06.
77. See id. at 106; LASH, supra note 43, at 5-6.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

supra note 51, at 106.
supranote 43, at 45.
See also LASH, supra note 43, at 75-76.
See id. at 76.
Id.
See id. at 75-76.
UROFSKY, supra note 41, at 62-63.
Id.
HIRSCH,

LASH,

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/13

10

Wrightsman and La Mort: Wrightsman: Why Do Supreme Court Justices Succedd or Fail
SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
2005]

what a terrible person Reed was or Black, going to Reed's office
86
telling Reed what a stupid person someone else was, and so on.
Certainly Justice Frankfurter's intellectual style and rigidity were not the
only reasons for his failure to lead the Court as Harold Ickes had promised
President Roosevelt.87 While he shared with Justices Black, Douglas, and
others a concern for procedural justice, his philosophy of judicial restraint
became increasingly out of touch with the needs of a society that began to
change dramatically in the 1940s. 88 For example, in the landmark case of
Baker v. Carr,Justice Frankfurter dissented, arguing that there is not "a judicial remedy for every political mischief."49 In response, Justice Douglas later
wrote:
[W]e began to realize that here was a man who instead of being a
friend and a champion of civil liberties was using his position on
the Court to line up allies for a constitutional doctrine that we
didn't, we couldn't go with.... So the explosions in the conferences had become more and more frequent, particularly between
him and Black, and between him and me, and we had become
more and more90suspicious of the good faith of the man, his intellectual honesty.
As noted earlier, some surveys include Justice Frankfurter on the short
list of "great" Justices. 9' But do these scholars separate his contributions as a
scholar before he became a Justice? Lash has written that "there are Frankfurter admirers who believe that Frankfurter's influence on constitutional law
was greater before he went onto the Bench than after and that [his scholarly
efforts as a professor] are of more lasting interest than the aggregate of his
judicial opinions., 92 While an admiring and sympathetic 93biographer, Lash
still concluded, "He was not one of the giants of the Court."

2. William Brennan
In contrast to Justice Frankfurter's nomination and appointment, Eisenhower nominated William Brennan to the Court almost entirely on the basis
of political considerations, specifically because he had attributes that would
86. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 297 (1997) (1994).
87. UROFSKY, supra note 41, at 62-63, 178-79.

88. Id. at 178.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 269-70 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
NEWMAN, supra note 86, at 297 (ellipses in original).
See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
LASH, supra note 43, at 87.
Id.
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facilitate the President's bid for re-election. 94 The conventional wisdom about
Eisenhower's presidency used to be that he was uninvolved, disengaged, and
more concerned about his golf game than the welfare of the country. 95 But a
revisionist view portrays Eisenhower as skillful and politically sophisticated
in his actions. 96 His choice of a Justice to fill Sherman Minton's position reflects the political nature of his thinking. 97 Early in 1955, well before vacancy
even existed, Eisenhower had several criteria in mind for locating a replacement. He expressed the wish to his associates that the next vacancy be given
to a Roman Catholic. 98 Recognizing that the Catholic vote would be important in his 1956 re-election campaign, he asked his attorney general, Herbert
Brownell, for "the name of some fine prominent Catholic to nominate to the
bench." 99 Later, as the election race heated up, Eisenhower wanted to communicate to the public the sincerity of his pledge to appoint federal judges in
a non-partisan manner.1° His first two appointments to the Supreme Court,
Justices Warren and Harlan, had been Republicans, as were all but a handful
of his appointments to the lower courts.' ' Therefore, he was interested in a
well-qualified Democrat to appoint.'0 2 Following Justice Warren's appointment, Eisenhower had already instituted a policy of naming nominees with
some previous judicial experience. 0 3 When Justice Minton resigned two
months before election'day in 1956, Eisenhower began looking for a Catholic
1
04
Democrat below the age of 62 with judicial experience in state courts.
This was a time before the ease of computer searches, and Attorney
General Brownell probably was not aware of just how few persons there were
who did fit the criteria. Almost fifty years later, political scientist David Yalof
did a systematic search and concluded that, at most, only three people in the
country fit Eisenhower's criteria, and two of these would have been flawed
nominees. 105 Although Eisenhower did not realize it, the only one who fully
Brenpossessed all their qualifications was the person they chose, 0William
6
nan, a fifty-year-old justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court.'
94. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM BRENNAN, JR. AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 88-89 (1993).
95. See, e.g., FRED

1. GREENSTEIN,

THE HIDDEN-HAND PRESIDENCY: EISEN-

7-8, 39-40 (1982).
96. See generally id.
97. See EISLER, supra note 94, at 88-90.
98. See id. at 83-84.

HOWER AS LEADER

99. DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND
THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 55 (1999).
100. Id. at 55-57.

101. Id. at 55-56.
102. Id. at 56.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 55.
Id. at 58.
See generally id. at 58-59, 179.
See id. at 58-59.
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Of course, the issue of the Brennan's non-political qualifications was a
concern, but Brownell seemed to base his recommendation of the Justice on a
speech that Brennan gave at a conference in Washington, D.C.107 There remains some question whether Brennan's speech was his own or one that Arthur Vanderbilt, the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court and his
boss, had asked Justice Brennan to give in his stead. 1 8 At any rate, Justice
Brennan was nominated and confirmed, and went on to be one of the most
influential and successful Justices in the second half of the twentieth century.
What made Justice Brennan so effective? 1' 9 In the late 1950s and early
1960s, Justice Brennan wrote some of the Court's most influential decisions,
including Baker v. Carr110 on reapportionment, Cooper v. Aaron11' on school

desegregation, and New York Times v. Sullivan 112 on First Amendment protections against libel. Writing in 1966, Chief Justice Warren stated, "In the
entire history of the Court, it would be difficult to name another Justice who
wrote more important opinions in his first ten years than has [Justice Brennan]."'1"3 Although Justice Brennan was in the liberal majority in these early
years, he was not at its extreme.' 1 4 His more cautious and moderate approach
would pay off later on, especially when other5 liberal members of the Court
were replaced by more conservative Justices."
Justice Brennan carved a middle path by seeking to avoid absolutes as
the bases for his decisions and to achieve a "balancing" of competing interests. 1 6 Thus Justice Brennan was seen, even by adversaries, as more openminded.' 17 His personality was perhaps his greatest strength in building coalitions; he was "[f]riendly and buoyant in spirit" and treated everyone with
genuine interest and concern. 118 Amiable to all, Justice Brennan never used
his clout to get his way and appeared modest about his own abilities. 1 9 When
107. Id. at 58. The flawed nominees had been Republicans earlier.
108. Id. at 58; Stanley Friedelbaum, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.: PolicyMaking in the Judicial Thicket, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL
PROFILES 100, 102 (Charles Lamb & Stephen Halpern eds., 1991).
109. Bernard Schwartz rated him as one of the ten best justices ever. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 4. Comiskey's scholars assigned him a rating of 3.56,
behind only Brandeis and Holmes among 20th-century justices. See COMISKEY, supra
note 27, at 91.
110. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

111. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
112. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
113. Earl Warren, Mr. Justice Brennan, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1966).
114. TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE BURGER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND

LEGACY 56-59 (2000).
115. See id.at 56-59.
116. See EISLER, supra note 94, at 186-91.
117. Id.
118. Warren, supra note 113, at 2.
119. See id. at 1-2.
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appointed to the Court, he told a friend, "I'm the mule at the Kentucky Derby
to distinguish myself but I do expect to benefit by the asso...I don't12expect
°
ciations.
In addition to possessing a healthy amount of intellectual discipline, Justice Brennan showed a remarkable willingness to consider the opinions of
others. 121 He always remained aware of the bottom line and was often quoted
as saying that "five votes can do anything around here."' 22 He displayed uncommon willingness to negotiate as well as a skill in revising his drafts to
accommodate the comments of his colleagues, including those more conservative than he.' 23 He would write and revise draft after draft, to incorporate
124
the views of potential dissenters.
Most important, Justice Brennan adapted to change, especially the
changing composition of the Court. In 1989, when conservatives dominated
125
the Court, his achievement of a majority decision in Texas v. Johnson is
perhaps the most remarkable example of his ability to form successful coalitions. In this flag-burning case, Joey Johnson had been sentenced to a year in
prison for his public act of protest during the Republican convention in Dallas
in 1984.126 Justice Brennan concluded that the conviction of Johnson for
burning a flag in political protest was violative of his First Amendment rights
to free expression of ideas.' 27 Justice Brennan wrote an opinion that attracted
Marshall
the support of Justices Kennedy and Scalia, in addition to Justices
128
and Blackmun, the more predictable defenders of free speech.
Justice Brennan used his highly effective interpersonal skills to advance
his policy goals. In so doing, he not only achieved fragile majorities in a conservative-dominated Court, but he avoided writing an excessive number of
dissents and, whenever possible, he joined in those opinions that were agreed
upon by most of his colleagues. 29 Thus, despite the fact that his choice by the
president was almost entirely on political grounds, 30 Justice Brennan became
one of the most effective Justices in the twentieth century.

120. EISLER, supra note 94, at 99.
121. See id. at 185.
122. BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 224
(1983).
123. See EISLER, supranote 94, at 185.
124. See, e.g., id. at 186-91.
125. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (5-4 decision).
126. Id. at 397.
127. Id. at 399.
128. See id. at 397. Justices Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor dissented, id. at 42135 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), and even Justice Stevens did so separately, id. at 43639 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but Brennan had his 5-to-4 majority. Id. at 397 (majority
opinion).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24.
130. See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
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IV.

HARRY BLACKMUN AS AN EXAMPLE

We now attempt to evaluate the success of Harry Blackmun, by first
considering some factors that might have influenced his effectiveness. Because Blaustein and Mersky proposed that the background of a Justice contributes to the judge's effectiveness, we examine Justice Blackmun's demographic characteristics. Recognizing that some presidents devoted more care
to making appointments than others did, we describe the background of the
decision to nominate Blackmun.
A. DemographicPredictors
How does Justice Blackmun stack up under Blaustein and Mersky's
predictive factors?131 Harry Blackmun was a Midwestemer, who was born in
Illinois and grew up in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota.' 3 2 His father
explored a variety of business careers, including fruit wholesaler, grocer,
hardware store owner, and insurance salesman, and his family was devoutly
Methodist (he first met Warren Burger at Sunday School at the age of 4 or
5).133 But he attended Harvard as an undergraduate (on partial scholarship)
and Harvard Law School. 134 When seated on the Court, Justice Blackmun
was 61.135 A consideration of Blaustein and Mersky's criteria
would predict
36
neither a great success nor an abysmal failure on the Court.'
B. Presidentas a Predictor
Presidents differ in the quality of their appointments to the Court. President Nixon appointed Harry Blackmun.' 37 Nixon promised to nominate "strict
constructionist[s]" who would shift the Court from the then recent Warren
Court decisions.' Nixon appointed three other Justices who were confirmed
39
by the Senate - Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist.'
Justice Blackmun0 was Nixon's third attempt to fill Justice Fortas's seat upon
his resignation.14

131.
132.

BLAUTSTEIN & MERSKY,
YARBROUGH, supra note

supra note 7, at 50-5 1.

114, at 83.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 85.

135. See id. at 83, 86.
136. See supra text accompanying note 32.
137. YALOF, supra note 99, at 114.

138. Id. at 113.
139. COMISKEY, supra note 27, at 7-8.
140. Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell had been rejected by votes of
55-45 and 51-45, respectively. Id. at 8.
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One of the few recent Justices not highly active in politics, while Justice
Blackmun came to be appointed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court by two Republican presidents (the first being Eisenhower,
in 1959), 141 he supported Democrat Hubert Humphrey in his campaigns for
mayor of Minneapolis and the U.S. Senate. 142 His nomination to the Eighth
Circuit received the endorsement of Senator Humphrey and Judge Warren
Burger, then on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.1 43 According to Justice
Blackmun's reminiscences, the essential reason that he was appointed to the
Eighth Circuit Court was that his mentor, Judge John Benjamin Sanborn of
St. Paul, insisted that he have a say in his successor, or he would not retire.1
Given the rejection of two previous nominees, Justice Blackmun's
nomination received acclaim from Senate liberals even though he was perceived to be very conservative. 145 During Justice Blackmun's confirmation
hearings, not a single witness appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee to oppose him. 46 Civil-rights and labor organizations did not protest his
only one day, and Justice Blackmun was
appointment.147 The hearings lasted
48
confirmed by a unanimous vote. 1
V. BLACKMUN'S SHIFT
As noted earlier, a possible reason for Justice Frankfurter's less-thanexpected effectiveness on the Court was his failure to adapt to new surroundings. 149 The challenge of adapting to the Supreme Court was hard for Harry
Blackmun, too. For example, Wasby called him "unsure of himself' when he

141. YARBROUGH, supra note 114, at 85.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Harry Blackmun, Some PersonalReminiscences and What They Meant for
Me, 29 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 323, 324-25 (2004).
145. COMISKEY, supra note 27, at 38; Richard Freidman, The Transformation in
Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominees: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administrationand Beyond, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 83 (1983).
146. YALOF, supra note 99, at 114. Although more recently, commentators have
labeled Justice Souter as a "stealth nominee," Justice Blackmun was the first "stealth
candidate" after the increase in publicity for presidential appointments beginning in
the 1960s and escalating after the failure of President Nixon's "southern strategy" in
the late 1960s. Kim I. Eisler, A Defense of Activism, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 911,
918 (1996); Stephen Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11
HAMLINE L. REv. 183, 185-86 (1988); see John E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 345, 352
(1995).
147. Id.
148. Id. In contrast, a year later, Justice Rehnquist was confirmed by a 68-26 vote.
Id. at 125.
149. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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began serving as a Justice.' 5 0 In contrast, Justice Blackmun's effectiveness
did not wane over the years as Justice Frankfurter's did. Over his 24 years on
the Court, Justice Blackmun moved from conservative to liberal.' 51 For example, in his early decisions regarding First Amendment rights, he either
favored a narrow interpretation, or rejected such rights.15 2 As Stephen Wasby
has noted,
"Blackmun's change, if not completely linear, has been clear over
15 3
time."
The shift in Justice Blackmun's position from relatively conservative to
relatively liberal has been analyzed by a number of scholars' 5 4 Perhaps the
most quantitative and succinct method to view Justice Blackmun's shift is by
examining the correlation between his votes and those of other Justices over
time. For example, in his first full term on the Court, Justice Blackmun voted
with Chief Justice Burger in 69 of 72 non-unanimous cases, and for his first
four years, Justice Blackmun agreed with Chief Justice Burger in 80% of the
cases.155 However, by the Chief Justice's last term in 1985, the correlation
dropped to almost 40%. 156 In contrast, in his initial four years, Justice Blackmun voted the same way as Justices Douglas and Brennan only 40-50%
of
15 7
the time. By 1985 he agreed with these liberal Justices 81% of the time.
Along with shifting allegiance to different Justices, Blackmun's dissenting votes increased, to a high of 34 in the 1982 term.158 As time went on, he
became more critical of certain majority opinions written by his conservative
colleagues. For example, in response to Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Toll v.
Moreno, 5 9 he called
the analysis "wholly irrational" and "simplistic to the
' 160
point of caricature."

150. Wasby, supra note 146, at 186.
151. See Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at Al (describing Justice Blackmun's trajectory from conservative to liberal).
152. See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: Transformation from
"Minnesota Twin" to Independent Voice, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND
JUDICIAL PROFILES 63, 81 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpem eds., 1991).
153. Wasby, supra note 152, at 70:
154. See generally id.; Malcolm L. Stewart, Justice Blackmun's Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271, 289 (1998); Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun: Criticism of
Retiring United States Supreme Court Justice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 2, 1994, at
13; Wasby, supra note 146, at 188.
155. See EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER: 19691986,276 (2000); Wasby, supra note 152, at 68.
156. YARBROUGH, supra note 114, at 32.
157. MALTZ, supra note 155, at 276.
158. Wasby, supra note 146, at 191 (Table 1).
159. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
160. Id. at 20 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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A. Shift in Votes on Death Penalty Cases
Justice Blackmun's position on the death penalty reflects the complexity
of the relationship between his attitudes and his votes. At a press conference
in April 1970, immediately after he had been nominated to the Supreme
Court, Justice Blackmun stated that he was personally opposed to capital
punishment. t6 1 However, his early votes did not reflect this avowed personal
position.' 62 While Justice Blackmun went nearly 13 years before dissenting
from a single decision upholding a death sentence, by the end of his tenure he
obligated simply to concede that the
wrote, "I feel morally and intellectually
6
death penalty experiment has failed."'
At the beginning of his time on the Court, Justice Blackmun supported
the State's right to use death as a punitive measure. 164 Just five months into
his first term, he joined in Justice Harlan's majority opinion in McGautha v.
California,which proclaimed, "In light of history, experience, and the present
limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life
65
or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.", A
year later in the case of Furman v. Georgia, Justice Blackmun offered an
important glimpse into his way of thinking. 166 A very difficult case, Furman
resulted in each of the nine Justices filing a separate opinion.' 67 Justice
Blackmun's individual dissent reflects his struggle between his personal values and his duty as a judge.' 68 He stated that
Our task here, as must so frequently be emphasized and reemphasized, is to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation that
has been enacted and . . . challenged. Th[at] is the sole task for
judges. We should not allow our personal preferences as to the

161. Blackmun, supra note 144, at 323, 331.
162. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 465 (1972) (plurality opinion). Justice
Blackmun joined several dissenting opinions in upholding imposition of the death
penalty. See id. at 375-405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He also dissented separately. See id.
at 405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, this position is in accord with Justice
Blackmun's stated belief that, regardless of his personal views, the death penalty was
"primarily... a matter of legislative prerogative." Blackmun, supra note 144, at 331.
163. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (upholding constitutionality of jury's power to impose death penalty without
governing standards).
165. Id. at 207.

166. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. See generally id.

168. See id. at 405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our distaste 1for
69
such action, to guide our judicial decision in cases such as these.
A further passage in this dissent reflects the salience of the struggle in
Justice Blackmun's mind:
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the
spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and,
indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of
physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For
me, it violates childhood's training and life's experiences, and is
not compatible with the philosophical convictions I have been able
to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life."
Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for the
policy reasons argued by counsel for the respective petitioners and
expressed and adopted in the several opinions filed by the Justices
who vote to reverse these judgments.'70
In the 1980s, Justice Blackmun began to find serious problems with the
manner in which the judicial system processed capital cases. His dissent in
Barefoot v. Estelle illustrates Justice Blackmun's concerns.' 71 In Texas,
where the trial took place, a jury could recommend the death penalty if there
existed "a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."' 172 In this case, two
psychiatrists had testified at the sentencing hearing that the defendant was
likely to commit further criminal acts.t 73 Even the American Psychiatric Association disagreed with the surety of their assessment, stating that "two out
of three predictions of long-term future violence made by psychiatrists are
wrong."' 74 In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Blackmun condemned the
use of faulty information to permit a death sentence.' 7 5 He wrote, "[t]he Court
today sanctions admission in a capital sentencing hearing of 'expert' medical
testimony so unreliable
and unprofessional that it violates the canons of
76
medical ethics."'1

169. Id.at 411.
170. Id. at 405-06.
171. 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), superseded by statute

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).
172. Id. at 883-84.
173. Id. at 884 (majority opinion).
174. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
175. Id. at 924 n.6.

176. Id.
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Five years later, in his dissent in Darden v. Wainwright,177 he wrote an
even stronger condemnation, stating, "Today's opinion ... reveals a Court
willing to tolerate not only imperfection but a level of fairness and reliability
so low it should make conscientious prosecutors cringe."'178 But at this point,
in the early 1980s, Justice Blackmun avoided condemning capital punishment
generally, while focusing on individual cases.
The final shift in Justice Blackmun's death penalty jurisprudence came
in 1991.179 In his dissent in Coleman v. Thompson, he attacked not only the
majority opinion but also the system itself, writing:
Even if the majority correctly attributed the relevant state interests,
they are, nonetheless, misconceived. The majority appears most
concerned with the financial burden that a retrial places on the
States. Of course, if the initial trial conformed to the mandate of
the Federal Constitution, not even the most probing federal review
would necessitate a retrial. Thus, to the extent the State must "pay
the price" of retrying a state prisoner, that price is incurred as a direct result of the State's failure scrupulously to honor his federal
rights, not as a consequence of unwelcome federal review.I1°
He also wrote that:
[T]he Court has managed to transform the duty to protect federal
rights into a self-fashioned abdication. Defying the constitutional
allocation of sovereign authority, the Court now requires a federal
court to scrutinize the state-court judgment with an eye to denying
a litigant review of his federal claims rather than enforcing those
provisions 8of the Federal Bill of Rights that secure individual
autonomy. ' '
These are not the words of a man who believes in the application of the death
penalty.
In 1994's Callins v. Collins,1 2 Justice Blackmun gave his final answer
to the death penalty question, expressing that:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery
of death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have
struggled-along with a majority of this Court, to develop proce177. 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (5-4 decision).
178. Id. at 189 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), superseded by statute 28
U.S.C. 2254(b)(2).
180. Id. at 767 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 761-62.
182. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (denial of certiorari).
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dural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than
continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of
fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated,
I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that
the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self evident
to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive
regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.... The problem is that the inevitability of
factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must
wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair,
consistent,
and reliable sentences of death required by the Consti83
tution. 1
After his strong Callins dissent, Justice Blackmun followed the practice
started by Justices Marshall and Brennan of issuinga brief statement reiterating his opinion on every capital punishment case.184 However, Justice Blackmun differed with the other Justices' grounds for condemning the death penalty. While Justices Marshall and Brennan focused on the Eighth Amendment's concern with cruel and unusual punishment, 185 Justice Blackmun disapproved of the number of errors in the legal process. 186 His belief that these
errors would lead to the execution of innocent persons led him to his final
position. 187

B. Why the Shift?
Several scholars have offered opinions for Justice Blackmun's shift in
positions. Stephen Wasby suggested that the Chief Justice's taking him for
granted diminished Justice Blackmun's allegiance to Burger.188 He wrote:

183. Id. at 1145-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial to grant certiorari).
184. See, e.g., MacFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1264 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial to grant certiorari) ("Adhering to my belief that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of our Constitution, I would grant
the petition for certiorari and vacate the death sentence." (citation omitted)); Wader v.
California, 512 U.S. 1253, 1253 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial to grant
certiorari) ("Adhering to my view that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly
within the constraints of our Constitution, I would grant certiorari and vacate the
death sentence in this case." (citation omitted)).
185. See, e.g., Vickers v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1990) (Marshall, J., with
whom Brennan, J., joins, dissenting from denial to grant certiorari).
186. Note that this was before the use of DNA to absolve prisoners on death row.
187. Id.
188. Wasby, supra note 152, at 70.
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Certainly Burger appears not to have been sensitive to his colleague's feelings about the derogatory "Minnesota Twins" label
and (particularly) the "Hip Pocket Harry" label, and public perception of Burger's dominance offended Justice Blackmun: "I have a
little anger underneath it all ....

Anger from being categorized

89
over the 12 years I've been here in a way I think never fit."'

Wasby suggested a second reason for Justice Blackmun's evolution the nature and amount of opinions assigned to Justice Blackmun by the Chief
Justice.19 In the early years, many of Justice Blackmun's assignments were
for unanimous or very one sided cases.' 91 Burger also gave Justice Blackmun
more than his share of tax cases, considered by the Justices to be the "dogs"
of the Court. 192 Wasby wrote:
The small number of cases assigned to Blackmun - the proportion
of times he was chosen when available to the chief justice was the
smallest for any justice during the 1970-1974 and 1977 terms might have been a function of Blackmun's
work habits, but the
93
lack of assignments did help alienate him. 1
As Justice Blackmun shifted away from being a predictable conservative
vote, the Chief Justice reacted by assigning him even fewer opinions.194 In the
1985 term, of the fourteen cases assigned 95
to Justice Blackmun, four came
from Justice Brennan, not the Chief Justice.'
Other scholars have offered a different explanation, contending, for example, that the shift was preordained. As Yarbrough put it, "the ultimate outlines of Blackmun's jurisprudence were foreshadowed by the moderate record he developed on the circuit bench."' 196 Another interpretation focuses on
the Roe v. Wade' 9 7 decision, and particularly its aftermath, concluding it
"heightened [Blackmun's] sensitivity to the plight of the weak and powerless. ' 198 As his former law clerk Edward Lazarus wrote:

189. Id. (quoting John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y.
February 10, 1983, at 23).
190. Id. at 70-71.
191. Id. at 70 (stating that many of the opinions were in 8-to-1 and 7-to-2 decisions).
TIMES MAGAZINE,

192. Id. at 70-71.
193. Id. at 70.
194. Wasby, supra note 146, at 197.
195. Id.

196.

YARBROUGH,

supra note 114, at 86.

197. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (plurality opinion).
198. YARBROUGH, supra note 114, at 88.
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I expect there is some truth to the alleged explanatory power of
Roe. No person could suffer such ugly assaults on his character and
intelligence over such a long period without accumulating emotional scar tissue. But I would venture that this was only one side
of the psychological calculus. For every brutal insult, for every
protestor shadowing Blackmun's public appearances, there was
someone, usually a woman, telling the Justice he had saved her
life, preserved her family, or allowed her to realize the life she
sought for herself. To the extent that the experience of Roe moved
Blackmun leftward over the years, I would say he was 99not only
pushed by criticism but pulled by a certain kind of praise. 1
There is Justice Blackmun's own take on the shift, that he did not
change his jurisprudence, but rather, that the Court did. It is true that in his
confirmation hearings in 1971, Justice Blackmun expressed the desire that his
opinions would show "in the treatment of little people, what I hope is a sensitivity to their problems. ' ,200 It is our position that Justice Blackmun's values
remained constant, but the exposure to one case after another caused his votes
to move closer to his values.
VI. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM BLACKMUN ABOUT

DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE?
A. Rating the Person Versus Rating the Justice
Although all the ratings described in this paper focus on judicial effectiveness, an evaluation of Justice Blackmun as a person cannot be avoided."'
His former law clerk Edward Lazarus called Justice Blackmun "the most
empathetic Justice in recent times, and very likely in the history of the
Court., 20 2 In interviews with prospective law clerks, Justice Blackmun always "insisted that his was the least desirable clerkship at the Court, in part
20 3
because his colleagues were more intelligent and better teachers than he."
Justice Blackmun knew the Court staff members by name. They saw him as
"unusually humble and approachable. ' 2°4 He breakfasted daily in the Su199. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
OF THE EPic STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 380, n.* (1998).

200. Rosen, supra note 154.
201. After all, one can be a highly-regarded justice and still be a less-thanadmirable human being, as the recent biography of Justice Douglas by Bruce Murphy
documents. See generally BRUCE A. MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (2003).
202. LAZARUS, supra note 199, at 39.
203. Id. at 23.
204. Wasby, supra note 146, at 187 (quotation omitted).
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preme Court public cafeteria with his
and other Justices' law clerks, where he
20 5
was quite visible and approachable.
But Justice Blackmun also manifested his share of human limitations.
Justice Blackmun agonized over decisions and - especially in his early years
- wrote slowly and in a plodding style. 20 6 Rosen described him as "finicky to
the point of obsessiveness." 20 7 He went on to say:
Blackmun was, as President Clinton said [at the time of his resignation from the Court], a good and decent and humane man, whose
compassion suffused his work and his life. Unlike some of his colleagues, he took his job seriously until the very end, and rather
than flitting about to dinners and receptions, he worked long and
lonely hours poring over the facts of the most obscure cases and
agonizing about the fate of the parties. If Blackmun tended to get
mired in trivial details, if many of his opinions seemed legally unsophisticated and overly emotional and if he often appeared to
reach the right result for the wrong reasons, nevertheless he cared
about the
Court and the country with a sincerity that commands re20 8
spect.
Even though Justice Blackmun was affected by criticism more than
most, he was not reluctant to occasionally castigate his colleagues in his written opinions. 2 09 For example, he called opinions of Justice O'Connor "overstated and inaccurate" and "substitut[ions] for useful constitutional analysis. '210 Justice Blackmun went beyond other Justices in his candor about the
workings of the Court, some of whom were probably appalled at his observations. For example, he told an interviewer that he frequently voted with Justices Brennan and Marshall "'to maintain a centrist balance' and 'to correct
211
the imbalance Justice O'Connor's presence creates."'
B. His Strengths and His Weaknesses
Within the Court, Justice Blackmun's influence was not impressive, as
he did not bring other Justices with him.2 1 2 As Wasby noted, his lack of influence "occurred both when he [wrote] for the majority, as in the badlysplintered Ballew v. Georgia case on jury size, and when he [wrote] in dis205. Id.; LAZARUS, supra note 199, at 28.
206. Rosen, supra note 154, at 13.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Wasby, supra note 146, at 193.
210. Id. at 194.
211. Id. at 190 (quoting John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, February 10, 1983, at 57).
212. Id. at 197.
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"most of his concurring opinions [were not] joined by
sent." 2 13 In addition
214
other justices.'
Perhaps the failure to bring others along occurred because Justice
Blackmun's own analysis was sometimes more emotional than logical.2 15
Rosen comments:
But feeling deeply is no substitute for arguing rigorously; and the
qualities that made Blackmun an admirable man ultimately condemned him to be an ineffective justice. By reducing so many
cases to their human dimensions and refusing to justify his impulses with principled legal arguments, Blackmun showed the dangers of the jurisprudence of sentiment. He committed liberals to the
unfortunate and inaccurate proposition that justices must resort to
personal sympathy in order to justify liberal results. Although he
occupied the seat of Holmes and Cardozo, Blackmun will be remembered in the rank of Frank Murphy, the warmhearted New
Dealer who wrote emotional dissents on behalf of the poor and
of his
powerless, but whose tendency to let his
216 heart get the better
head deprived him of lasting influence.
Comparing the dissents by Justices Blackmun and Brennan in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services2 17 illustrates this point.
In this case, the parents of Joshua DeShaney had divorced within a year after
he was bom, and the father, Randy DeShaney, was granted custody. 218 For
more than two years, young Joshua was beaten by his father. 219 In January
1982, social workers became aware of the abuse. 2 His father's girlfriend
brought Joshua to the hospital for treatment, covered with bruises and abrasions.221 His father denied that the injuries were a result of abuse.222 Two
months later the hospital once more treated Joshua for suspicious injuries, but
found no proof of abuse. 223 Several times when county social workers tried to
see Joshua at home, his father denied them access.2 24 By the age of four
Joshua had been beaten so repeatedly and severely that he suffered extensive
213. Id.
214. Id. at 198.
215. Rosen, supra note 154, at 188.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
218. Id. at 191.

219. Id. at 192-93.
220. Id. at 192.
221. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 299
(7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
222. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
223. Id.; see DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 300.
224. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
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brain damage and had to be permanently institutionalized. 225 His father was
convicted of child abuse. 226 Joshua's mother brought a civil suit against the
Department of Social Services (DSS) of Winnebago County, Wisconsin,
claiming that the social workers had failed to intervene when they had clear
reason to suspect that the boy was in danger.22 7 The case focused on two issues: whether this failure to act violated Joshua's Fourteenth Amendment
right not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law 228 and
whether Joshua's mother had a right to sue the State.229
Justices Blackmun and Brennan sympathized with Joshua's mother's
claim but relied on differing analyses to dissent from the majority opinion
230
that the mother did not have the right to sue the state. 0 Justice Brennan applied a logical argument to support his conclusion that the State should be
accountable: "[I]naction can be every bit as abusive of power as action...
oppression can result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then ignores
it.' ' 23 1 In contrast, Justice Blackmun avoided a legalistic argument and ex-

pressed his opinion in more human terms:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew
exor learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing
232
cept.

.

. "dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files."

His dissent included the statement that "[This] is a sad commentary
upon American life, and constitutional principles," but in his dissent, he did
not say why he thought constitutional principles were violated. 233 While Justice Blackmun's dissent is more frequently quoted, it lacks what Justice
Brennan's dissent provides, an effective logical argument why the majority
opinion is wrong.
225. Id.
226. Id. The father served less than two months in prison. J. Randall Patterson,
Intimate Injuries: Are There ConstitutionalLaw Protections From Family Violence,
15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1992). But that was not punishment enough to satisfy

Joshua's mother, who lived in Wyoming and had not had the opportunity to observe
the day-to-day developments. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (stating that Joshua's
mother brought suit against Winnebego County, the Department of Social Services
(DSS), and various employees of DSS); DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 300.
227. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See generally id. at 203-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 212-13 (Black-

mun, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 211-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 193 (majority opinion)).
233. Id.
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C. His Placein History
The most recent and comprehensive scholars' ratings of Justices gave
Justice Blackmun a rating of 2.66, somewhat above (but not statistically sigplacing him between
nificantly above) the average for all Justices
234 of 2.46, and
the "good" (3) and "fair" (2) categories.
In terms of our criterion of the ability to influence, Justice Blackmun
also comes out in the middle. Roe v. Wade will always be associated with
Justice Blackmun, but few others of his opinions were groundbreaking or of
major significance. However, he will always be highly regarded by social
scientists for his support of, and even reliance on, empirical data and writings
by psychologists and psychiatrists in a number of his opinions, including
those in Ballew v. Georgia235 on jury size, Barefoot v. Estelle236 on predicting
dangerousness, and Bowers v. Hardwick2 37 on the mental health of homosexual persons. Justice Blackmun should be regarded by scholars as a man who
was humble and yet reached the pinnacle of his profession. His impact may
not be as large as Justice Brennan's or Justice John Marshall's, but few are.
He will be remembered as a good man who became a good Justice through
hard work, and who served a quarter century fighting for the little person.

234. CoMISKEY, supra note 27, at 90, 98.

235. 435 U.S. 223, 224 (1978) (plurality opinion).
236. 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), superseded by statute
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).
237. 478 U.S. 186, 203 & n.2 (1986) (5-4 decision) (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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